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TRACING THE PATTERN OF NO PATTERN:
STORIES OF POLICE BRUTALITY
Susan Bandes*
Remember, gentlemen. The policeman is not there to create

disorder. He is there to preserve disorder
There is a certain delicacy in being an outsider invited to come
to a town in the throes of a scandal and to heap additional ignominy
on that town for its troubles. And therefore to assure this audience at
the outset that I do not intend to lecture from the perch of one from a
place where "it's done correctly," I hasten to introduce myself as
being from Chicago. Or, to strengthen my bona fides even more, as
a New Yorker who has spent many years in Chicago. 2 So that in ad-3
dition to being a native of the locus of the Louima and Diallou
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. I would like to thank Catherine
Fisk and Samuel Pillsbury for organizing the superb conference on the Rampart scandal at which this paper was first presented.
As this Article was going to print; two additional important developments involving the Rampart scandal occurred. First, a jury rendered guilty
verdicts against three of four defendants in the first criminal prosecution of
police officers growing out of the scandal. Second, an independent report
commissioned by the Los Angeles Police Commission was issued. The report
was highly critical of the department, finding deep systematic problems with
LAPD culture. For a discussion of these subsequent developments, see Susan
Bandes, To Reform the LAPD, More Civilian Pressure is Necessar, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at M6.

1. Mayor Richard M. Daley, Statement During the 1968 Democratic Convention, quoted in CONNIE GODDARD & BRUCE HATTON BOYER, THE GREAT
CHICAGO TRIVIA AND FACT BOOK 59 (1996).
2. In 1997, during a scuffle outside a nightclub, Abner Louima, a Haitian
immigrant living in New York City, was sodomized by police with a plunger,
suffering a torn colon and a ruptured bladder, while being subjected to racial
epithets. Officer Justin Volpe eventually pled guilty to charges arising from
the incident and shortly thereafter, Officer Charles Schwarz was convicted of
holding Louima down while Louima was being sodomized. See Susan Bandes,
Patternsof Injustice: Police Brutali., in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275,
665
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scandals, I make my home in the town of which the real Mayor
Daley once said: "The policeman is not there to create disorder. The
policeman is there to preserve disorder."4 At that time the statement
was dismissed, obviously too hastily, as a malaproprism. Since then
we have learned, among many other things, of the existence of a
longstanding ring of police officers who routinely tortured suspects
on Chicago's South Side, with the implicit or explicit condonation of
a host of other individuals and groups. Several of those former suspects are on death row in Illinois today. So we like to think we can
compete with Los Angeles in the scandal department.
I have studied in detail Chicago's Area Two Violent Crimes
Unit,5 in which the torture ring flourished for at least thirteen years,
both as its own phenomenon and in the broader context of police
brutality nationwide. The Rampart scandal shares some salient characteristics with the story of Area Two, and also with the Abner
Louima incident. These stories are so shocking, so far beyond the
pale, so unlike what we would consider ordinary police misconduct,
that they seem unique, or at least highly out of the ordinary. Yet for
all their shock value and seeming uniqueness, all these scandals
had-to various degrees-depth, breadth, and longevity in their respective departments, and none of them arrived without warning.
These stories raise the crucial question of what we mean by
systemic, as opposed to isolated, police wrongdoing. This is a crucial question because it determines the seriousness we accord the
problems, the measures we take to solve them, and perhaps most important, our very understanding of the nature of the problems
1284-86 (1999); Bob Herbert, Living in Denial,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at

A31.

3. In 1998, an unarmed West African immigrant named Amadou Diallo
was killed by a hail of forty-one bullets fired by four members of the NYPD's
controversial street crimes unit. The four officers were criminally charged, but
acquitted at trial. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 1286; Elisabeth Bullmer &
Ginger Thompson, Thousands GatherAgain to Protest Police Shooting, N.Y.
TIMES,

Feb. 10, 1999, at A33; Bob Herbert, At the Heart of the Diallo Case,

N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2000, at A19.

4. GODDARD & BOYER, supra note 1, at 59.
5. During a period of at least thirteen years, a large number of African
American men, perhaps as many as sixty, were tortured into confessing by
several named officers in the Area Two Violent Crimes Unit on Chicago's
South Side. See JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE AcTs, ORDINARY PEOPLE:
THE DYNAMICs OF TORTURE 233-41 (2000); Bandes, supra note 2, at 1288-89.
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themselves. And if we conclude, as I will argue we should, that the
Rampart scandal, like Chicago's Area Two scandal and New York's
Louima incident, must be understood as part of a much broader systemic dysfunction, that conclusion raises another question: What explains the deeply ingrained resistance to systemic reform?
Before I address that question, let me describe briefly the work I
have been doing and how Rampart fits within it. My particular focus
is on systemic police brutality and the ways in which its nature is
masked; on the ways in which patterns of widespread wrongdoing
are anecdotalized. That is, I want to focus on the resiliency of the
story of the solitary rotten apple in the otherwise pristine barrel.
[Overwhelmingly,] the view of police brutality as aberrational (or even justified) shapes the conduct of every institution responsible for dealing with the problem, including
police command, review boards, administrative agencies,
city, state and federal government, and the courts. This
view allows police brutality to flourish in a number of
ways, including making it easier to discount individual stories of police brutality,
and weakening the case for any kind
6
reform.
systemic
of
How and why do department-wide, citywide, even nationwide
patterns of brutality become transformed into the story of systemic
probity and efficiency, occasionally sullied by the aberrant behavior
of a few bad cops? There is no question that innumerable hurdles to
identifying or addressing systemic problems exist. At every step of
the way, information that could help identify patterns of brutality is
either not collected, actively turned away, ignored, misinterpreted,
covered up, misrepresented, or rendered inaccessible through failure
to record, track, organize, or communicate it.
Let us look at the Rampart scandal, which is instructive, and, as
I will discuss later, quite representative. The Los Angeles Times
gives us a helpful timeline which begins the story on March 2, 1998,
the date on which "[s]ix pounds of cocaine [was] checked out from
property room at LAPD headquarters, ostensibly for use as evidence
in a drug trial,' 7 and dates the discovery of the story at
6. Bandes, supra note 2, at 1278.
7. The Rampart Scandal: Genesis of a Scandal, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 25,

2000, atA18.
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mid-September, 1999, when Officer Rafael Perez entered a plea
agreement in his trial for stealing that cocaine.' Thus, the story begins with the criminal act of a single officer, Officer Perez, and is not
flagged until it is authenticated by a police officer-Perez himself.
Other suspicions about Perez that might have helped identify
both his own patterns of egregious misconduct and their links to
broader patterns were discounted in distressingly familiar ways. To
take just one of many possible examples, in 1993, Perez and his former partner David Mack fatally shot a man named Jesse Vicencio. 9
Two witnesses testified that Vicencio was unarmed, but both witnesses were easily marginalized since both knew Vicencio and both
had a history of brushes with the law.' 0 Two investigations accepted
Perez's and Mack's accounts of the circumstances of the shooting.1
Though the Christopher Commission12 in 1991, specifically criticized the fact that department investigators' definition of "independent witness" excluded those who knew the alleged victim, 13 it was
standard practice in 1993 to discount the statements of such witnesses, and remained so in 1999 when the scandal was "uncovered."
The Commission also criticized the "unwritten rule" of automatically
giving greater weight to a police officer's statement than to a complainant's,' 4 yet that practice also remains standard. When the investigation was reopened in 1999, investigators upheld the propriety
of the shooting without even interviewing the witnesses.15

8. See id. He was convicted of stealing eight pounds of cocaine. See id.
9. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Witnesses Say Officer Killed Unarmed
Suspect, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at Al.

10. See id.
11. See id.

12. In the aftermath of the beating of Rodney King, the acquittal of the officers involved, and the subsequent riots that swept Los Angeles, an independent
commission headed by attorney Warren Christopher was established to conduct a "full and fair examination of the structure and operation of the LAPD."
INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT app. 1 at 2 (1991)

[hereinafter CHRISTOPHER

COMMISSION REPORT].

13. See HUMAN RIGHTS

SHIELDED FROM

JUSTICE: POLICE

BRUrALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

WATCH,

206 (1998) (citing

and discussing the ChristopherCommission Report).
14. See id.
15. See Glover & Lait, supra note 9.

January 2001]

TRACING THE PATTERN

669

Questions of credibility are of paramount importance in resolving brutality claims, since most brutality takes place in secret: in interrogation rooms or back alleys.16 Those who attempt to corroborate allegations of brutality are often dismissed as untrustworthy or
self-serving, because they are often friends or relatives of the complainant, or gang members, or people who have had brushes with the
law, or uneducated and inarticulate, or, for a variety of other reasons,
easy to marginalize. 17 First, such corroboration is discounted, and
then, once the credibility dispute is falsely reduced to a swearing
contest between officer and complainant, the tie goes to the officer."8
The officer is assumed to be a disinterested civil servant, whereas the
complainant is presumed to have a motive to lie. This set of presumptions is one important means by which information about possible police brutality is suppressed or misinterpreted. An investigation conducted without such presumptions might still vindicate the
officer's version, but, as the Rampart scandal makes clear, in many
cases it might not.
But the system builds in ways of turning away information well
before it reaches the stage of formal investigation. New officers
continue to be inadequately screened despite the Christopher Commission's recommendations to improve hiring procedures.' 9 The
Christopher Commission had also registered concern that, as in the
Rodney King case itself, the department was either actively discouraging, failing to record, or inaccurately recording civilian complaints. 20 Even if complaints were taken they were not properly
tracked, despite the fact that a pattern of unsustained complaints is a
valuable means of flagging problematic patterns. 2' In many cases
even sustained complaints of excessive force were not entered into
16. See Bandes, supra note 2,at 1325.
17. See id. at 1290.
18. See id.

19. See Nicholas Riccardi & Jeffrey L. Rabin, Report Echoes Christopher
Panel'sFindings,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at Al.
20. See, e.g., Lou CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE: How RODNEY KING
AND THE RIOTS CHANGED Los ANGELES AND THE LAPD 142 (1997); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 202; JAMES SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE,
ABOvE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESsIvE USE OF FORCE 3 (1993).

21. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 202; Riccardi & Rabin,
supra note 19.
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officers' personnel records, and thus decisions on assignment and
promotion were made without knowledge of them."2 Even when
such findings were entered they made little difference in an officer's23
career; officers with many complaints were routinely promoted.
Moreover, sustained complaints were not tracked either since the
LAPD lacked a central database of officers' internal records.24 The
recent Board of Inquiry Report found all of these problems to persist
today.25 Particularly astonishing was the continued failure to implement a computerized tracking system for complaints, in light of the
fact that the Justice Department had allocated approximately
$162,000 in 1997 to implement this centrally important recommendation of the Christopher Commission.2 6 Another source of information that is routinely ignored is the incidence and pattern of settlements and verdicts against officers for excessive force. Despite
the fact that the city pays out tens of millions of dollars a year in civil
judgments and settlements against police officers, the fact of such
settlements is neither recorded in the officers' files nor tracked to
discover problem officers.2 7
As we now know, there were in fact a horrifying number of such
unjustified shootings involving Perez, his compatriots, and his supervisors, including the shooting and crippling of a handcuffed Javier
Ovando, who was then framed and imprisoned for assault.2 8 But as I
have argued, there were all sorts of accepted and ingrained ways to
discount or anecdotalize these shootings so that any pattern was
22. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAS 51 (1995).

23. See id.
24. See Jim Newton et al., LAPD Condemned by Its Own Inquiry Into Rampart Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al; Riccardi & Rabin, supra note
19, atAl.
25. See Newton et al., supra note 24.
26. See Tina Daunt & Jim Newton, Civil Rights Probe of LAPD Expected
to Grow, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al; Newton et al., supra note 24 (referring to tracking system as a "key Christopher Commission reform [which
the Riordan administration allowed] to languish despite its public pledges to
implement those changes and after years of publicly clamoring for the implementation of the tracking system").
27. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 229-31.
28. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 2nd LAPD Shooting Targeted as CorruptionProbe Widens, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1999, at Al.
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masked. These include the aforementioned presumption of police
credibility, which helped cover a multitude of sins, including a widespread culture of police perjury29 of a sort that extended far beyond
the well-known blue wall of silence. The presumption of credibility
helps shield not only active lying on the stand, but planting, manufacturing, and destroying evidence, use of throw-down guns, falsi30
fying charges, and other active means of covering up wrongdoing.
Other means of masking patterns include the lack of meaningful supervision of an "elite" police unit that was already physically removed from the gaze of supervisory personnel. 31 Such supervision

was not forthcoming from a police command that either turned a
blind eye to32 or participated in wrongdoing, 33 or wanted to know
only about "the count" and not about the methods used to achieve
it. 34 Nor was it forthcoming from a district attorney's office that
was, depending on the source, either too cozy with the police 35 or
unable to penetrate the wall of silence.36 The lack of supervision
29. This is what Perez called "taking it to the box." Scott Glover & Matt
Lait, Police in Secret Group Broke Law Routinely, Transcripts Say., LA.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al (defining "taking it to the box" as being willing to
lie on the witness stand to protect police wrongdoing); see also Matt Lait &
Scott Glover, City Near CriticalChoice as 4th Officer Faces Charges: Rampart,L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2000, at Al (quoting a complainant who said Rampart Officer Michael Buchanan falsely charged him with drug possession, then
taunted him about his chances in front of a jury if he sought to dispute the
charge, saying "Who do you think they are going to believe? Are they going
to believe you or me?").
30. See, e.g., Glover & Lait, supra note 29.
31. See Jim Newton, Ex-Rampart Commander a Focus of Probe, Sources
Say, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, atAl.

32. See James Sterngold, Los Angeles Police Admit a Vast Management
Lapse: But Their Report Seeks No Outside Inqui.v, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2000,
at A14 (discussing startling lack of internal audits).
33. See Glover & Lait, supra note 29.
34. See id.
35. See Jim Newton & Ann W. O'Neill, Captain Under Fire as Rampart
Probe Expands, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at Al (noting that some said the
district attorneys in the "roll-out' unit would simply accept the Police Department's own investigation); Beth Shuster, Special Report: Recalling the Rodney
King Beating and Riots, the City Attorney's Office Preparesfor Falloutfrom
PoliceProbe,L.A. TIMES, Sept.26, 1999, at B1 (quoting attorney Ira Salzman,
who represented brutality complainants, saying "city and county prosecutors
may have had 'too cozy a relationship'").
36. See Nicholas Riccardi & Beth Shuster, D.A. to Revive Unit That Inves-
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meant that the police themselves had tremendous control over the
portrayal of their actions, both in court and in documents.37 Thus,
although Police Chief Bernard Parks claimed that oversight would
not have helped since it was dependent on the accuracy of reports
generated by the police themselves, it appears that meaningful oversight could have had a substantial effect on the content of the reports
themselves.38
In short, a large cluster of shootings by a group of police officers
concentrated in a single unit is anecdotalized, first, because each individual shooting was classified as justified through a series of presumptions about credibility, lax oversight, and a culture that values
results regardless of the means used to achieve them, and, second,
because even if a shooting were classified as unjustified, there was
no effort to track patterns to identify problem officers, locations, or
situations. The pattern was identified only because it was, fortuitously, testified to by a police officer.39 However, the pattern is anecdotalized in another, perhaps more subtle way when the participants in the ° Rampart scandal are called "an organized criminal
4
subculture.
In the Los Angeles Times, the unpleasantness at Rampart is always referred to the same way, as a corruption "incident," 4 or a corruption scandal, 42 or some variation of those terms, like "the city's
tigates Police Shootings, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1999, at Al (noting that some

claimed "roll-out" system which placed district attorneys at scene of police
shootings was ineffective because police kept prosecutors back from the scenes

and blocked interviews with officers for days); see also Glover & Lait, supra

note 29 (referring to an account by Perez of methods of insuring that no supervisors-or even an ambulance-would come to the scene of an officerinvolved shooting).
37. See Glover & Lait, supra note 29.
38. See Jim Newton, LAPD CorruptionProbe May Be Test for City Leaders, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1999, at Al.
39. See, e.g., Genesis ofa Scandal,supra note 7.

40. Id.

41. In his superb independent report reviewing the Board of Inquiry Report,

Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that the use of the term "incident" is itself
part of the failure to convey the magnitude of what occurred. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Depart-

ment's BoardofInquiry Report on the RampartScandal, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
545, 550 (2001).

42. See, e.g., Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 4th Officer is Charged in Corruption Scandal, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at Al.
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worst ever corruption scandal." 3 That the scandal involves corruption is quite obviously true. That it involves serious criminal behavior, including theft, rape, and murder, also seems to be true. But to
classify this conduct as corrupt or criminal, while important in terms
of recognizing its seriousness and arriving at appropriate punishments, may also cloud its connection to other problematic, though
less dramatic, police practices, and to the causes they share. The
bottom line question is whether this way of thinking about what happened at Rampart is best calculated to lead to meaningful and enduring systemic reform
Consider the portrayal of Perez. Detective Brian Tyndall, in
trying to explain what he and his fellow investigators felt when
prosecuting Perez, said, "[w]e were disappointed that a police officer
would cross the line." "But," added Commander Dan Schatz, "after
a while, he's just not a police officer anymore." 44 Three months earlier, Mayor Riordan had told the police department's rank and file,
"[t]his incident is not about you.... You have the support of the Los
Angeles community., 45 Similarly,
[w]hen Abner Louima was sodomized by [New York City]
police with a plunger, suffering a torn colon and a ruptured
bladder, while being subjected to racial epithets, Police
Commissioner Safir said he did not consider it "an act of
police brutality" but rather "a criminal act committed by
people who are criminals." 46
He also opined: "'[a]lthough it's a horrific event, it's a rare
event." ' 47 After Officer Justin Volpe's guilty plea to sodomizing
Louima and Officer Charles Schwarz's conviction for holding him
down, Mayor Giuliani hailed the verdict as evidence that police officers found the conduct reprehensible and perverse.
43. Matt Lait & Scott Glover, 2 Officers Likely to Face Comiption
Charges,L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at Al.
44. Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes on Momentum of its
Own, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1999, at Al.
45. Newton & O'Neill, supra note 35.
46. Bandes, supra note 2, at 1284-85 (citing Bob Herbert, Living in Denial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at A3 1).
47. Id. (citing Joseph P. Fried, US. Takes Over the Louima Case; 5th Suspect, a Sergeant,Is Indicted,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1998, at Al).
48. See Editorial, Verdict Shatters Blue Wall, N.Y DAiLY NEWs, June 9,
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The problem with these statements is not that they brand felonious acts by police officers, including sodomy, rape, aggravated assault, theft, and murder, as criminal. Indeed, one systemic problem
that desperately needs addressing is the widespread refusal of prosecutors, both state and federal, to bring criminal charges against police
officers in appropriate cases. 49 The problem, rather, is the creation of
a subtle and pernicious double bind that serves to disguise patterns
and thwart reform. On the one hand, if behavior has to rise to the
criminal level to be addressed departmentally, then the bar is far too
high. Of course such a problem is compounded by overly capacious
definitions of criminality. For example, Paul Chevigny, considering
why both the Sheriffs Department and the LAPD had failed to discipline officers for shootings, recounts the following: The standard
of both departments for imposing discipline was that it would be imposed only if the District Attorney found the conduct to be criminal;
however, the District Attorney never indicted.50 Chevigny found that
both the D.A. and the police used a similar yardstick: shootings were
acceptable if done "in the line of duty and in good faith--that is, for
a purpose related to police work and not, for example, to settle a personal score."'', Although this definition is too broad-it is perfectly
possible to commit a criminal act, including murder, while acting in
the line of duty52 any definition of criminal behavior is bound to
exclude substantial amounts of serious police misconduct that need
to be addressed.
On the other hand, once police conduct does reach a level that
police management or the public are willing to recognize as criminal,
1999, at 34.

49. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 85-89 (discussing
rarity of state criminal charges against L.A. police officers); Paul Hoffman,
The Feds, Lies and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in
ControllingPolice Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1457
(1993) (discussing the Justice Department's traditional hands-off attitude toward state level police brutality).
50. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 22, at 50.
51. Id. at51.
52. Chevigny notes that the many shootings by the Los Angeles Special In-

vestigations Unit (SIS), which was castigated for standing by and waiting for

suspects to commit violent crimes and then shooting them as they returned to
their cars, would not be considered criminal under that definition and that, indeed, none of the officers involved were indicted. See id. at 48, 51.
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it is recategorized as something other than police work." Now the
cop is no longer a cop, but a criminal committing a criminal act, and
apple who in no way represents or taints the
by definition, a rotten
54
rest of the barreL
Another way of looking at the problem is that the appellation,
"criminal," sometimes seems to be used only as a means of preventing accountability, rather than a means of fostering it. For example,
in Chicago, after years of strenuously denying allegations of police
torture at Area Two, officials finally acceded to pressure to fire the
ringleader, Commander John Burge.5 5 Although the torture spanned
more than a decade, involved several officers, and was inflicted on
approximately sixty men, none of the other officers involved in the
torture suffered consequences, and no systemic reforms were even
attempted. 56 Instead the city sought to isolate and demonize Burge
and to avoid indemnifying him for a civil damage verdict awarded to
two of those he tortured, claiming he "acted outside the scope of
[his] employment," when he "cruelly torture[d]" arrestees 5 7 One
would hope that torturing suspects is outside the scope of employment, although note that given the fact that it occurred as part of interrogation sessions, it would meet the "line of duty" definition discussed above.5 8 The Chicago Police Department remains, to this
day, apparently unconcerned about systemic torture at Area Two, except that it does not want to pay damages for its effects. Branding
John Burge's conduct "savage torture" and "an exceedingly marked
and unusual deviation" only confirms the fiction that it is the rogue
behavior of a single rotten apple. 59 In short, if it looks criminal, it is
not police work. If it is police work, it is not criminal. And if it is
not criminal, it need not be addressed at all.
53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 44 and accompanying text
55. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 1289; John Conroy, The Shocking Truth,
READER, Jan. 10, 1997, at 30.
56. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 1277-78; Conroy, supra note 55, at 30-31.
57. CONROY, supra note 5, at 233-34. Had the city prevailed in this argu-

ment, as Conroy pointed out, the result would have been to erect a major hurdle to civil suits for police misconduct.
58. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
59. CONROY, supra note 5, at 34 (quoting the assistant corporation counsel

characterizing the acts of John Burge after judgment was entered against him
and the city sought to avoid indemnifying him).
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Arguably, a similar sort of reasoning helps explain the Diallo
verdict exonerating four officers for killing the unarmed Amadou
Diallo on his doorstep in a hail of forty-one bullets. 60 There was
substantial controversy, particularly in the wake of the not-guilty
verdicts, over whether criminal charges were an appropriate way to
address the Diallo matter, and substantial debate over what went
wrong during the trial.61 But a far more important question has been
overshadowed in the debate over the criminal charges. If we agree
that something went very wrong during the police confrontation with
Diallo, even if that something was not
criminal and was not corrupt,
62
fixed?
be
it
can
how
what was it, and
As Paul Chevigny explained in his brilliant study of police violence in the Americas, when criminality and corruption are viewed as
entirely separate from police brutality, important connections are obscured in two ways. 636 4 First, corruption and brutality share many of
the same root causes.64 Second, corruption leads to brutality, and to

the failures of accountability that allow brutality to thrive.65
Corruption of the sort engaged in by Perez and his compatriots
unquestionably brought them profit-money and drugs--and other
personal benefits, such as a flexible and largely unsupervised work
place. 66 But in this situation, like the very similar situation denounced by the Mollen Commission in New York, it would be a
mistake to think profit was the sole motive. Here are the highly relevant words of the 1994 Mollen Commission Report:
Corrupt officers usually raided drug locations for profit, but
sometimes also to show who was in control of the crimeridden streets of their precincts; sometimes to feel the
power and thrill of their badges and uniforms; sometimes
60. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 3.
61. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, The Story the Jury Never Heard, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2000, at A3 1; Ginger Thompson & C.J. Chivers, Diallo Case
Yields More Nuanced View ofPolice,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at A1; Jeffrey
Toobin, The Unasked Question, NEW. YORKER, Mar. 6, 2000, at 38.
62. See Richard D. Emery, The Verdict: Poor Training and Supervision,

N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2000, at A15; Herbert, supra note 3.
63. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 22, at 78-80.

64. See id. at 78-79.
65. See id. at 78-80.
66. See Glover & Lait, supra note 29.
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because they believed that vigilante justice was the only
way to teach a lesson or punish those who might otherwise
go unpunished. 7
These words ring far too true when we consider the testimony of
Perez and others involved with Rampart. They describe a unit that
committed acts of intimidation, including beatings and shootings, as
a means of exerting control.6 8 Officers would use fear and intimidation tactics to assert their domination on the street,69 and in the stationhouse they would beat and shoot suspects "for sport." 70 There is
a common thread that connects this kind of physical violence with
the police torture used against Abner Louima and the suspects in
Area Two. It is a kind of vigilante justice, and sometimes a form of
summary punishment, which is seen as acceptable because the forces
of law are inflicting it upon the forces of criminality. It is an outgrowth of assumptions embedded in police culture, but particularly
in certain types of police culture. The Christopher Commission discussed the "siege mentality" and the "us-them" attitude that pervade
police cultures, like that of the LAPD, that reward aggressive, hardnosed behavior and large numbers of arrests. 71 The Chemerinsky report gives ample evidence that this aggressive, control-centered
mentality, which dates back to Chief William Parker, still flourishes
in the LAPD.72 Significantly, Perez's testimony established that this
was exactly the mentality, and the reward system, which pervaded
Rampart CRASH.73 Perez told investigators that the Rampart
method of doing business "produced big results for Rampart
67. CHEVIGNY, supra note 22, at 78 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTICORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT
MOLLEN COMMIssION REPORT]).

(1994) [hereinafter

68. See Matt Lait et al., ChiefSays Probe Is Likely to Snare More OJfficers,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at Al.
69. See id.
70. See Glover & Lait, supra note 29.
71. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 20, at 106.
72. See Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 563-64.
73. Such a mentality is closely associated with "elite" police units like
CRASH, or like New York's Street Crimes Unit, whose officers committed the
Diallo shooting and whose slogan was "[W]e own the night." See Jane Fritsch,
Squads That Tripped Up Walking the Bad Walk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at
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CRASH. Officers brought suspects in by the carload .. . . In
short, this course of conduct was not just about monetary rewards for
a few officers, but about producing the results the unit was encouraged to produce.
The CRASH unit was described as mimicking gang behavior.75
Yet it is likely that its officers saw themselves, not as being interchangeable with the gang members whose territory they policed, but
as firmly on the correct side of the thin blue line, doing what had to
be done to maintain order.76 In the words of Paul Chevigny:
Both corruption and brutality can be used for social control,
as part of the police endeavor, found everywhere, to enforce
order directly, without intervention by other parts of the
criminal justice system or the government generally. The
police who were caught by the [Mollen] [C]ommission
were creating a renegade system of justice in which it was
their function to control crime by taking its profits and administering punishment."
Corruption and brutality reinforce each other in a number of
complex ways. If it were just a matter of a group of renegade streetlevel cops taking the law into their own hands, how could it be permitted to go on for so long? Why was supervision so lax? Why was
information that could have highlighted patterns of wrongdoing so
resolutely ignored or misinterpreted? In particular, why were many
of the Christopher Commission's recommended reforms, meant to
address just these problems, not implemented? Note the testimony
of Perez about why supervisors failed to more carefully scrutinize the
arrest reports: "All they cared about was that at the end of the month
money and
...how much total narcotics was brought in, how7 much
8
how many bodies.... That was the only concern.
74. Glover & Lait, supra note 29.
75. See Lait et al., supra note 68.

76. See Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 564 ("A mentality developed that

gangs presented a crisis requiring extraordinary efforts at control; Rampart of-

ficers came to see Latino and African-American men between 15 and 50 who
had short hair and baggy pants as gang members and felt that any efforts to
remove them from the streets, including by planting evidence, were warranted.").
77. CHEVIGNY, supra note 22, at 79.
78. Glover & Lait, supra note 29.

January 2001]

TRA CING THE PATTERNF

Supervisors may not want to root out corruption and therefore,
they may not want to know about it. Of course, it is possible that
they do not want to root out corruption because they are reaping
some of the profits, and there is some evidence that this occurred
with the CRASH unit. 79 But the causes go much deeper. The Mollen Commission discussed the willful blindness of a department that
feared a corruption scandal more than the corruption itself.80 Supervisors all the way up the chain of command want to maintain a good
image of the department, and they want to keep their jobs. Furthermore, they are usually produced by the same police culture that produced those they supervise-and they are likely to share its values.
That culture may well accept the infliction of a certain amount of excessive force on those who are "known" to be criminals, as well as a
certain amount of perjury to protect both the police themselves and
their maintenance of order.8 ' The blue wall of silence, though, does
not protect just "a little" excessive force. In rewarding both loyalty
and silence, it protects corruption, and it implicates all those who
perjure themselves in corruption as well. 2 Thus, everyone has
something to lose when corruption is uncovered.
Now Los Angeles has a corruption scandal of epic proportions.
If the fear of exposing corruption is in part a fear of the destabilization and chaos that will ensue,8 3 the scandal provides the opportunity
to come face-to-face with our worst fears, and see how bad destabilization really is. But when the maintenance of stability is dependent
on perjury, corruption, and brutality, we should welcome this period
of instability as a time for a systematic overhaul. At the same time, it
79. See id.
80. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 22, at 81 (citing the Mollen Commission Report); Bandes, supra note 2, at 1286.
81. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Bhe Wall of Silence" as
Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjur,,59 U.
PiTt. L. REv. 233, 252-55 (1998); Stanley Z. Fisher, "Justthe Facts,Ma'am":
Lying and the Omission of Exculpatoy. Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEw
ENG. L. REv. 1, 12 (1993) (calling police deception part of the culture, not aberrational).
82. See, e.g., CHEVIGNY, supra note 22, at 80 (citing Mollen Commission
Report). See also the testimony of Perez that any supervisor "in the loop"
would perjure himself because "he's been right there with us. He's done it all
before." Glover & Lait, supra note 29.
83. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 1320-27.
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is important to acknowledge a harder truth: the police are not the
only ones who have a stake in the preservation of order and in the
means used to achieve it. Although there are many aspects of police
culture that are hermetic and dangerously cut off from the people the
police are meant to serve, no police culture could thrive, ultimately,
without the acquiescence of the more powerful portions of the citizenry. Just as supervisors are focused on the count and do not really
want to know how it was achieved, so too the citizenry may be willing to turn a blind eye to perjury and to assume that officers are
truthful and upstanding enough, so long as its neighborhoods are
kept safe and brutality occurs outside its range of vision. Particularly
in segregated cities like Chicago and Los Angeles, we need to examine carefully the implicit pact that nonminority affluent citizens
have made with the police and to make it clear that lawless and brutal policing of any neighborhood is morally unacceptable.

